Participative and inclusive cooperation, networking and a fluid mix of governance solutions are important innovative attempts to overcome gridlocks in international cooperation to achieve sustainable development. Will they be able to succeed in an international environment driven by power rivalries and conflicting interests? This blog posts puts the attention on the joint-decision trap which lingers wherever decision making depends on consensus and cooperation. The Joint-Decision Trap is jointly responsible for many gridlocks at the UN Security Council and the UN at large but it can as much become a threat to innovative forms of participative and inclusive governance processes - if they don't strive to mind the trap.

Intergovernmental, participative and inclusive governance can be very innovative but they must be smart enough to not run into traps lingering in the way

The discussion on effectiveness and efficiency of international development cooperation is decades old. There is a widespread agreement among governments and non-state actors on the need to reform of international organizations (IO) and development cooperation. However, apart from smaller reforms here and there little is happening. It seems that a major overhaul of the system of international organizations and development cooperation is not likely to happen soon. Therefore and considering the urgent need to deliver on internationally agreed development goals, institutions began to search for new, more flexible and efficient forms of governance and financing. This is driven by hope to improve delivery and to trigger innovation and reform of the larger system.

It looks a bit like an old wall where fresh green is growing in the cracks of the wall. In international development cooperation the fresh new green is represented by terms like ‘participative planning and policy making’, ‘inclusive global governance’, ‘networked multilateralism’ or ‘fluid mix of governance solutions’. Indeed, it is inspiring and motivating that there are many new studies, e-papers, webinars and seminars promoting participative and inclusive governance making use of networked and a fluid mix of governance solutions to overcome gridlocks aiming at building back better and accelerating cooperation and goal achievement. Well, it is known that nature is strong and easily takes over areas once inhibited and that deserted by humans. And, one should never underestimate that a small innovation here and there can trigger a major reform or transition of an entire system. But does the fresh green in development cooperation have a chance to succeed while Great-Power rivalries exist? Kemal Derviş and Sebastián Strauss of the Brookings Institution asked in an article of the Project Syndicat on 21 April 2021 'Can Multilateral Cooperation Coexist with Great-Power Rivalry?'. Well, the article didn't really answer the question but it described the danger that Great-Power Rivalry in the world may block cooperation and, I think, new forms of governance have to be developed in a way that they become resilient enough to sustain in the international environment as it is.

Imagine you would be elected as the tenth UN Secretary General later this year. On your first day you would enter your office strongly committed to implement the Agenda 2030 with its 17 SDG and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. What you are likely to encounter at your office is a situation where two trains are running seemingly unattached across the world stage, both trying to lead the way. Firstly, there is the traditional multilateral cooperation as it forms the basis of the United Nations. Secondly, there is the even more traditional power rivalry among the great powers. There were times when multilateral cooperation was stronger than today but times since World War II have never been free of power rivalries. Well, and why you see multilateralism and power rivalry you don’t see much of the ‘We the people’ as it is stated so prominently at the beginning of the Charter of the United Nations. If it is already difficult for multilateral cooperation to coexist with Great-Power Rivalry new forms of governance have to be even more aware of the challenge of this environment. There is not only an old system with cracks in its walls and some fresh green but there is heavy weather where power rivalries, multiple crises and constantly emerging new issues are threatening good willing cooperation. 

It’s important - I would even say that it is indispensable - to have a vision and dreams and to be open and optimistic. However, if important things are at stake, like peace on earth or the survival of humanity, it is advisable to keep an eye on weaknesses and risks on the way to success. And even if the vast majority of actors is composed of good willing institutions and individuals there may be traps related to the modes of governance and cooperation which can provide free riders with a chance and which in return may even kill any chance of success. 

Joint-Decision Traps

The Joint-Decision Trap JDT was identified by the political scientist Fritz Scharpf and published in the scholarly article, Scharpf, Fritz W. (1988). The Joint-Decision Trap. Lessons From German Federalism and European Integration. Public Administration, Vol. 66, No. 2. pp. 239–78.

"The Joint-Decision Trap is understood to be a situation in which there is a tendency for government decisions to be taken at the lowest common denominator in situations where the decision-makers have the ability to veto the proposals."

If you ever wondered why decision-makers in political negotiations tend to limit their commitments below original intentions it may have to do with one of these situations. Analysing such situations and evading possible joint-decision traps is therefore paramount for the problem-solving capacity of political agreements. 

The specific analysis of Joint-Decision Traps but also the analysis of forms of interaction in general can be very elaborate and complex. It may include considerations of game theory and, more importantly, it requires full information on the policy environment, institutional context, actors, their orientations and capabilities, constellations, forms of interaction and knowledge on the problems to be addressed. And of course, the complexity grows with the numbers of actors involved and the dynamic of the process.[1]

Joint-Decision Traps in intergovernmental negotiations

To start, let’s begin with the United Nations Security Council. According to the UN Charter, Article 23, the Security Council consists of fifteen UN members: 5 permanent members with veto power and 10 non-permanent members without veto power. This membership makes the case relatively easy to analyse. As soon as there is no unanimity among the five permanent members Russia, USA, China, France and Great Britain any resolution is blocked and trapped. The unanimity requirement for the permanent members of the Council and the frequent power rivalries among these members makes the Council a classic case for a joint-decision traps.

The General Assembly of the UN has 193 members and each of the 193 countries represented at the Assembly has one vote with the same weight as the vote of each other country. The Assembly is the main intergovernmental body of the UN. It aims at consensual decision making but it can take also majority decisions. This setting with 193 members seems to be more complex than the Security Council with 5 permanent members but could a decision of the Assembly outvote a decision by the Council? No, because the resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly are - unlike the Security Council - not binding on the UN member states under international law. A decision of the Assembly cannot change or outvote a legally binding decision of the Council or the fact that one permanent member of the Council stops a Council draft decision by using its veto. This link between General Assembly and Council further increases the weight of the Security Council in the institutional setting of the UN and in return the risk that problems are not solved because they get stuck in a joint decision trap. And this context has major consequences for sustainable development cooperation. As a resolution of the General Assembly the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development Goals of September 2015 is also not binding on the UN member states under international law. This means: No country can be sued if it doesn't achieve the goals. Instead, cooperation and consensus finding are without alternative.

Joint-Decision Traps in networked multilateralism and a fluid mix of governance solutions

Efforts to reform the UN charter, intergovernmental bodies, their membership and competences failed so far and with unanimity and veto power being major generators of UN gridlocks governments, stakeholders and analysts started locking for other modes of governance to prevent the trap. Such efforts met with calls from local authorities, stakeholders from civil society and private sector to get a voice in international decision making on those subjects which affect them.

If you ever attended a major conference of an international organization you may know the governance mode which developed in response to the above situation: Yes, there are the closed meetings of intergovernmental bodies. They are usually attended only by delegates from member states. However, in addition to these there are often hundreds or even thousands of other participants from governmental authorities, civil society, academia and private sector who convene in parallel at side events or other meetings and conferences. This can sum up to twenty or sometimes thirty thousand participants as in case of the Habitat III Conference in Quito, Ecuador in 2016. The 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference, COP 21 was held in Paris France, from 30 November to 12 December 2015. 195 national delegations attended the conference but there were also numerous non state-parties who organized side events.

Under Corona conditions such events take place mainly virtually and looking at the CO² emissions of participants travelling across the globe one may question the value added of thousands of participants without a role in the decision-making. However, while there is usually no direct impact of side events on official intergovernmental meetings, these extended frameworks generate an indirect impact on negotiations. And maybe more importantly, each of these events is a market of ideas and a demonstration of strength of non-governmental participants. Still it remains somewhat opaque what drives thousands to meet near the venue of conferences where they have no voice in the decision-making. Therefore, this emerging trend needs closer attention.

Chatham House’s insights into the emerging practice of practical pathways for embedding inclusivity into global governance arrangements

International affairs institutions including Chatham House and the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP) are among those who pay more attention to analyse emerging practices of a more informal engagement of state and non-state actors striving to make global governance more inclusive.

Marianne Beisheim and Felicitas Fritzsche at the SWP analyse the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the High Level Political Forum (HLPF) Review 2021 and discuss the future of a ‘networked multilateralism’. At the centre of their approach are ECOSOC and HLPF as anchor points (Andockstellen) for non-state actors to join the dialogue of ECOSOC and HLPF. Already today, ECOSOC is in charge of cooperation with non-state actors but according to SWP partnership platforms with non-state actors could be filled with a lot more life. The SWP authors regard this as a pragmatic step to build bridges with decision-makers from national governments and non-state actors because the later are needed to achieve internationally agreed goals.[2]

Chatham House on its part organised in 2020 a series of roundtables of its ‘Inclusive Governance Initiative’. Based on the roundtables Chatham House published in April 2021 a very interesting Synthesis Paper ‘Reflections in building more inclusive global governance’. At its centre it presents ten cross-cutting insights on state governance and emerging practice.[3]

[1] Scharpf, Fritz W. (2006): The Joint-Decision Trap Revisited. In Journal of Common Market Studies 44(4), 845 – 864.

Scharpf, F.W. (1997) Games real Actors Play. Actor-Centred Institutionalism in Policy Research (Boulder, Co: Westview).

[2] ECOSOC und HLPF Review 2021: Bau- und Andockstellen für einen vernetzten Multilateralismus. Beisheim, Marianne und Felicitas Fritzsche, in: Baustellen des Multilateralismus. Global Policy Forum, Bonn, Seiten 32 -43. www.globalpolicyforum.org.

[3] https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/04/reflections-building-more-inclusive-global-governance?utm_source=linkedin.com&utm_medium=paid-social&utm_campaign=lnkd-inclusive-governance-intl-affairs&utm_content=linkd-pr-c1 – accessed on 17 May 2021

Chatham House’s Ten Insights on State Governance and Emerging Practice

1.    Agency has become more dispersed, but the power for transformational change at a global level still predominately lies in the hands of states

-       States remain the anchor of the international system.

-       International organizations are built on member state charters and can only push systemized global governance as far as states are willing to go.

-       Global coalition-building is still largely driven by traditional state-to-state diplomacy.

2.    Multilateral institutions provide a unique platform for developing nations, advocates/champions of particular issues and non-state-actors to have a voice.

-       (…)

3.    Governments and international organizations recognize the growing strength if nonstate actors, but inclusion means more than just creating a ‘larger tent’.

-       (…)

4.    Multilateral organizations may face a trust deficit, but so do multi-stakeholder initiatives

-       Inclusive governance is not about how to have everyone at the table. It is about having the right mix.

-       Stakeholders recognize when engagement is superficial.

-       Outcomes depend on a clear purpose. A lack of outcomes affects stakeholder participation.

-       Multi-stakeholder processes are susceptible to challenges associated with elitism, power imbalances and the influence of money.

-       The speed and agility of non-governmental stakeholders can be assets.

-       Inclusivity projects gain credibility by engaging early and often, throughout the policy life cycle.

-       Multi-stakeholder initiatives can widen fissures and inequities.

5.    Transparency should be a priority when rebooting global governance. It is not a principle. Data, open access and citizen action can create new opportunities.

-       (…)

6.    Plurilateral, regional and ‘minilateral’ governance solutions have become popular alternatives to multilateral gridlock.

-       (…)

7.    Subnational arrangements can be resource to bring global governance closer to people and an asset in the implementation of global agreements.

-       (…)

8.    Youth inclusion needs to shift from listening mode to policy participation. Global challenges demand an intergenerational perspective.

-       (…)

9.    Capacity-building is an effective means to cultivate more inclusive global governance.

-       (…)

10.  Rapidly evolving global issues will require a fluid mix of governance solutions. It is the only way to keep pace with the complex challenges of today’s world. But existing global rules and law still have a role.

-       (…)

The paper by Chatham House and especially the ten insights acknowledge the search for alternatives to multilaterale gridlocks. It also includes indications of possible joint-decision traps e.g. by pointing to trust deficits of multi-stakeholder initiatives. However, the paper but doesn't address the risk of running into a joint-decision trap. Neither Chatham House nor SWP propose new structures or formal competences for local authorities and other non-state stakeholders in decision-making. Instead, they call for ‘networked multilateralism’ as proposed by SWP or a ‘fluid mix of governance solutions’ as outlined and discussed by Chatham House.

The papers by Chatham House and SWP are very inspiring and solution oriented. However, would their pragmatic and incremental approach have a chance to revitalize multilateralism and to overcome great-power rivalries?

Yes, to follow their or similar approaches certainly would have the advantage that actors are only loosely coupled, more freely in their action and there seems to be nobody with a veto power. But is this enough to exclude a joint decision trap? No, because parties can be trapped in both, a too tight and also in a too loose coupling of actors and constellations.

I had the privilege to analyse the latter case of loose coupling in my PhD thesis about multi-stakeholder cooperation in context of the European Union Community Initiative Programme INTERREG IIC CADSES in Central and South-eastern Europe.[1] In this case cooperation began with a honeymoon of a purely informal cooperation which could be described as ‘networked multilateralism’ or a ‘fluid mix of governance solutions’. It emerged out of the situation after the fall of the iron curtain and the end of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. Governmental systems in Central, Eastern and South-eastern Europe were in transformation. The old structures were already broken but the new onese not yet established. It was a time with lots of optimism and energy. New forms of cooperation were explored with freedom following approaches like trial and error. Everybody looked for cooperation and nobody asked for a closer and more formalised cooperation and so all kinds of informal cooperation mushroomed.

The downside was this: Without formalising cooperation in a cumulative standard of acquired rights (in case of the EU this is called Acquis Communautaire) all fluid forms have to be reconfirmed or even re-negotiated each time you want to do something together. And you always have to consider emerging issues, changes in the actor constellation and institutional setting. With new governments established and new interests formulated all across Central and Eastern Europe and in face of several successive wars on the Western Balkans this honey moon soon reached its limits. It was inspiring and creative but it didn’t solve pending problems.

In a next step EU funding programmes like the Community Initiative INTERREG in cooperation with EU external relation interventions like PHARE and TACIS for Eastern neighbours brought funds. Shortly after the Eastern enlargement of the EU applied the Acquis Communautaire in new member states. Unfortunately, all this was done in a hurry and so they haven’t used the honeymoon of their early cooperation to discuss and agree on political principles and challenges. EU standards were more or less helicoptered to the East.

And no surprise, today countries like Hungary and Poland struggle with some principles of democracy and rule of law of the EU. It isn’t yet sufficiently analysed by research but I wouldn’t be surprised if the informal networking approach and the fluid mix of governance solutions of the early years contributed to the joint-decision trap member states are now confronted with: their need to agree but don't share the same basic values. This might have been prevented by a more thorough discussion of the acquis within the countries applying for membership. To omit this was a hands-on approach to foster european cooperation but it also was a bit naive.

[1] Graute, Ulrich, 2004: Politikverflechtung in der Politikverflechtungsfalle. Kooperation im Mehrebenensystem der Europäischen Raumentwicklungspolitik, Raumforschung und Raumordnung, Heft 1, 62. Jahrgang, Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 18-26. Graute, Ulrich, 2002: ESDP and INTERREG II C – applying an informal policy of the Member States with help of a formal intervention of the Community, in: Borislav Stojkov: Danubian and other Planning Issues. University of Belgrade, 2002, Belgrade, 1-16. Graute, Ulrich, 2002: Kooperation in der Europäischen Raumentwicklungspolitik – Mehrebenen-kooperation in komplexen Politikprozessen analysiert am Beispiel der Formulierung und Implementierung einer Politik zur integrierten Entwicklung des europäischen Raums. IÖR-Schriften 34, 2002, Dresden: IÖR, 306, ISBN 3-933053-16-1.

Avoiding Joint-Decision Traps in International Cooperation for Sustainable Development

Certainly, it would be helpful if international cooperation could prevent the risk of running into joint-decision traps - be they due to a too loose or too tight coupling. This is not an argument against networked multilateralism and a fluid mix of governance solutions but they shouldn’t be seen simply as an escape from a gridlock. Instead, they should be used strategically as opportunity to search for forms of governance which are reliable, support problem-solving and are able to rebalance international cooperation. Otherwise, they turn into a lost opportunity and we have no time and opportunity to loose.

There is no simple formula on how to avoid joint-decision traps but a mix of practice experience, learning from past experience, intensifying research and capacity building can help to make new forms of governance solutions resilient enough so that they can succeed in an environment of vetted interests and power rivalry:

• Practice, practice, practice: More practical experience is needed in applying emerging forms of networked multilateralism and a mix of fluid forms of governance solutions. With more practice experience it is likely that the understanding will grow on how to strategically use emerging practical pathways for problem solving.

• Learning from past experience: Governance is not in its infancy. Instead, whenever countries and societies were in transition, e.g. after war, revolution or at the end of colonization, new forms of governance were explored. This rich experience of transition periods should be analysed and lessons to be learned should be identified.

• Research: While the world is investing heavily in information technology and artificial intelligence its research, infrastructure and equipment many governments even reduce investments in social science. Instead, with a growing world population we also need to invest more in social science research. E.g. it needs to be better understood how different governance solutions work in complex constellations with growing numbers of actors in a dynamic policy environment, what is networked multilateralism and what is a suited fluid mix of governance solutions.

• Institution and capacity building: For negotiations with civil society and other non-state actors governments need qualified counterparts with a strong representative mandate. It is nt enough that networks of non-state actors call for a seat at the table of decision making. They also must qualify themselves to represent society. Therefore, networks of non-state actors need to further professionalize and become more representative.